It was not until the 1990s when the influx of the foreign direct investment generated significant demand for unskilled labour that the government loosened its control over rural-urban migration. However, even today the hukou system still restricts labor mobility, though in a more subtle way. Migrants in cities are treated differentially from their urban hukou counterparts. They often obtain lower-end jobs and are not entitled to social welfare and social services which are available to urban hukou people. As such, migrants and their families have no access to unemployment, health care, or pension support in cities; and their children only have limited access to urban public schools.
Who Migrates and How They Are Doing in Cities
In response to institutionalized discrimination, most migrants come to cities alone, leaving their families behind in the rural villages. For example, data from the RUMiCI 2 2009 migrant survey indicate that of the 5214 migrant household heads, around 56% are married, and of these only 63% have their spouse with them. Among children of migrants who are aged below 16, 56% are left behind in rural villages. Because of these left-behind families, migrants have a special demographic structure.
Migrants normally come to cities in their late teens and return to the home village at the marriage and child-bearing age for women (around 25-30 years of age) and when children start schooling for men (in their mid to late 30s). RUMiCI rural household survey data indicate that at the age of 25, 58% and 50% of the male and female rural labourers, respectively, have migrated out of their own counties to work in 2009, whereas at 35 years, only 30% males and 20% of female have migrated. In total 22% of the rural labor force worked in cities in 2009 (Meng,2012 (forthcoming) ).
On average, migrants in cities in 2009 are 32 years of age, and around 59% are males. The mean years of schooling is 9.2 years whereas for urban hokou workers it is 11.5 years. Migrants work extremely long hours, mainly work as manual labourers, and earn much lower wages than their urban counterparts. This is true in the 1990s (Meng and Zhang, 2001 ) and still the case now. In 2009, 31% of urban workers held a professional or managerial job while the proportion for migrants is a mere 3%; 91% of migrants work as production or service workers, while the proportion for urban workers is 35% (Frijters, Meng and Resosudarmo, 2011) . Migrants, on average, work 63 hours a week, while their urban hukou counterparts work 43 hours, almost one third less. Although this difference may be due to the fact that more migrants working as self-employed (28%) than their urban counterparts (6%), when comparing hours of worked for wage-salary workers only the difference is also large (57 vs. 42 hours). The average hourly earnings for migrant wage-salary earners is 7.4 yuan in 2009, while for their urban counterparts it is 16.6 yuan.
None of the above differences can be fully explained by the observed differences in human capital (such as age, city work experience, and education); physical capital (height and health); or regional variations (cities where they work). For example, after controlling for these observed differences migrant wage-salary earners still earn 6.4 yuan less per hour than their urban counterparts, almost 40% less (Frijters, Kong and Meng, 2011) . Furthermore, the RUMiCI survey shows that there are only 13.5% of migrants with unemployment insurance, 17 percent with work injury insurance, and 12 percent with a city health insurance. These ratios for urban local workers are 66%, 87% and 64%, respectively.
Institutional discrimination increases the rural workers' opportunity cost of migration. As a result, the number of rural-urban migrants may be significantly smaller than it could have been. Had there been no institutional restrictions deterring marriage-and child-bearing aged rural women, parents of school-aged children, and children of elderly parents from migration, the proportion of rural worker who would choose to migrate might well have been double its current level.
Turning Point?
As demand for unskilled labour increases in cities, and institutional restrictions to migration keep many rural workers from migrating, Chinese cities begin to experience unskilled labour shortages and wages of unskilled workers have begun to rise. Since 2004, many scholars have argued that China has reached the Lewisian turning point, whereby the rural surplus labour has been absorbed and urban and rural unskilled wages will begin to rise.
The argument that China has reached the turning point is based on the increase in wages of unskilled migrant workers in the past decade and on the belief that as China's population enteres a period of rapid aging, labour supply in the near future will be tight. In addition, there are some evidence that rural wages are also increasing. Furthermore, it has also been argued that improvements in rural education will reduce the supply of unskilled workers (Zhao and Wu, 2007; Du and Wang, 2010; Cai, 2010; and Zhang, Yang, and Wang, 2011) .
Not all scholars believe that the Lewisian Turning Point has arrived (Minami and Ma, 2010; Yao and Zhang, 2010; Knight et al, 2011; Golley and Meng, 2011; Ge and Yang, 2011) . In particular, using household level data these studies provide evidence that the relative wages of unskilled to skilled workers in cities have been decreasing rather than increasing over the period [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] ; only around 20-23 percent of the rural hukou labor force moved out of their own county into urban cities; those who migrated stay in cities, on average, for only around 7 years. Golley and Meng (2011) suggest that if institutional change can reduce the churning of migrants so that the average duration of migration is doubled, the supply of migrant workers in cities would be doubled. In fact, the RUMiCI survey asks migrants to state the length of time they would like to spend in cities if the policy allows them to choose. 63% reply that they would choose to stay in cities forever. In other words, government policy can do a great deal to ease migrant supply "shortage".
The Future Challenges
As a result of the institutionally induced "labor shortage", city firms are moving towards more capital-and technology-intensive technologies. Labor intensive investment has begun moving to other developing countries and new investments have much higher human capital requirements. Will China's future labor supply be well equipped for this important change?
To answer this question, one needs to know the primary source of the future labor force. The One-Child Policy (OCP) was strictly enforced for the urban hukou population but not for the rural hukou population. Consequently the urban hukou births shrank significantly after the OCP. The 2000 Population Census data indicates that for the population aged 20-29 (those who were born just before the OCP) the ratio of urban and rural hukou population is 38%, whereas for those who were aged 10-19 and 0-9 in 2000 the ratios reduced to 25% and 23%, respectively. The population pyramids below show that the future labor force will mainly come from the current rural hukou population.
Then, how well is rural hukou population equipped for the future changes? The answer is not very encouraging. In 2000, the rural hukou population between 20 and 65 years of age has on average 7 years of schooling while their urban hukou counterparts have 11 years. 19% of the urban hukou population has education at 3-year college or above level, while for rural population this ratio is 0.24%. For younger generation, those born between 1970 and 1980, the ratio of urban hukou population with 3-year college or above education is 28% while for rural population it is 0.54%. The significant rural-urban divide in education, together with the transition of the Chinese industry towards a capital-and technology-intensive structure induced by the institutional restrictions on migration, will pose enormous challenges for China's future rural-urban migration and economic growth. If the institutional restrictions on migration cannot be dismantled quickly and rural education continues to lag behind, many rural workers will be confined to rural areas, the urbanization process will slow down, and rural under-employment and urban labor shortage will co-exist for a long time (Meng, 2012 (forthcoming) ). Thus, an important challenge facing the Chinese government in the next few decades is to make the policy changes so that rural and urban population are treated equally in any dimensions and to speed up the quantity and quality of education in rural areas. 
